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Summary
The Balassa Samuelson effect is a central result in trade theory. It is also fundamental to our
understanding of what occurs during economic growth. As it turns out, the positive
relationship between real income and the price level predicted by Balassa Samuelson occurs
only after 1970. Why does Balassa Samuelson hold for recent years but not earlier? We
provide an empirical explanation for this puzzle. Our point of departure is the observation
that measurement error in comparative GDP data biases standard tests against finding a
Balassa Samuelson effect. Allowing for measurement error, we find that Balassa Samuelson
is present in the data for all post-war decades.
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Introduction
Recent years have seen fresh interest in the celebrated Balassa Samuelson effect of
Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) where growth is accompanied by faster rates of
technological progress in traded sectors and a rise in the price level.1 This work includes
Bergin, Glick and Taylor (2006), Fitzgerald (2003), Ghironi and Melitz (2005), amongst
others. The new literature marks a major advance on previous work as it supplies the
missing micro foundations for Balassa Samuelson. In particular, it uses trade costs,
heterogeneous firms and imperfect competition to explain why technological progress is
faster for traded sectors. Research in this area received a second boost from the empirical
findings of Bergin, Glick and Taylor (2006) henceforth Bergin et al. Bergin et al (2006)
show that Balassa Samuelson exists for recent decades only. They term their findings the
long run price puzzle. Since economists have long assumed that Balassa Samuelson is a
constant of the growth process, their results have far reaching implications.2
Why is Balassa Samuelson a recent phenomenon? This is an important question
given the central role of Balassa Samuelson for trade and growth theory. We provide an
empirical resolution for the puzzle. Our point of departure is the argument that measurement
error in comparative GDP data has biased previous empirical tests against Balassa Samuelson.
After adjusting for measurement error, we find that Balassa Samuelson is present for all postwar decades.

1

Although formalized by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) the ideas behind Balassa Samuelson go
back to Ricardo and earlier see Officer (1982). Rogoff (1996) surveys traditional approaches to Balassa
Samuelson while Taylor and Taylor (2004) look at recent developments.
2

This is particularly the case for key applied questions such as Purchasing Power Parity and international
income comparisons.
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We proceed as follows. Section two outlines why comparative GDP data sets contain
measurement error. We demonstrate that such errors can explain why the data provide so
little support for Balassa Samuelson before 1970’s and why Balassa Samuelson strengthens
over time. In addition, we show that we can get around measurement error by testing Balassa
Samuelson with data on nominal GDP. Building on these results, section three provides new
evidence on Balassa Samuelson. After adjusting for measurement error in our estimation
procedures, we find the Balassa Samuelson effect is present in cross-sections of the Penn
Tables for all post-war decades. In common with Bergin et al (2006), however, we find that
Balassa Samuelson has strengthened over recent decades.
Section four provides a panel test of Balassa Samuelson. For the most part, the
findings confirm the earlier results. Section five provides two final extensions. First, we
provide a Monte Carlo simulation that adjusts for the potential endogeneity of nominal
income. Second, we crosscheck our findings by looking the benchmark income comparisons
of the International Comparison Project (ICP). The results from both exercises are broadly
supportive of Balassa Samuelson. Section six sums up. We argue that Balassa Samuelson is
a robust feature of the post-war data. In addition, we suggest that the recent strengthening of
Balassa Samuelson is the inevitable consequence of globalization.

3

2.

Testing Balassa-Samuelson when GDP data contain measurement error
Standard tests of the Balassa Samuelson effect relate the price level to income and a

set of other explanatory variables. Consider equation (1) where pit and yit are logs of the
relative price level and real income per capita of country i measured in terms of the US at
time t; Z is a vector of other explanatory variables, α is a vector of coefficients, and εit is a
disturbance term. By relative price levels, we mean price indices that compare price levels
across economies at a point in time. The Balassa Samuelson effect requires that β is positive
meaning that the price level increases with income.

(1)

pit = Zit ⋅ α t + β t yit + ε it

The usual source for cross-country GDP and price data are the Penn World Tables.3
Using Penn data, Bergin et al (2006) show that Balassa Samuelson first appears in the data
during the early 1960’s and then strengthens over time. For our purposes, we see their results
as posing two related puzzles. First, why is there such a weak relationship between real
income and the price level before the 1970’s? Second, why does Balassa Samuelson
continue to strengthen? We argue in this section that both of these puzzles are explainable by
GDP measurement error.
To understand the sources of GDP measurement error, we must outline how Penn
constructs its GDP estimates.4 Penn starts with a benchmark income comparison. This is
1996 for version 6.1 of the Penn Tables used in this paper. Penn obtain their 1996 GDP
3

A second strand of the literature directly tests the claim of differential productivity growth see Canzoneri,
Cumby and Diba (1999) or Choudri and Khan (2004).
4

Neary (2004) provides theoretical foundations for the Penn procedures.

4

benchmark for country i by deflating nominal income by the relative price level as calculated
with detailed price and expenditure data from the International Comparison Project (ICP) of
the United Nations. Penn calculates domestic price levels relative to “world prices” where
world prices are weighted national prices using weights based on shares in world expenditure
(see Kravis (1984) for more details). The GDP benchmark for country i is thus in 1996
world prices. To generate GDP series for other years, Penn projects its GDP benchmarks
backwards and forwards using data from domestic national accounts. Income per capita for
country i relative to the US is the ratio of the projected series for country i to projected US
income. This gives relative income per capita in 1996 world prices.
The Penn GDP data contain measurement error. By measurement error, we mean that
the Penn estimate of relative GDP per capita differs from “true” relative GDP in 1996 world
prices. Measurement error comes from three sources. First, there is sampling error in the
ICP price surveys. These errors are likely to be small. The second source of error is the
extrapolation procedure used to project the Penn benchmark comparisons outside the 1996
benchmark. Because of data constraints, Penn projects GDP using data on consumption,
government spending, investment and the external balance.5 As noted by Kravis (1984),
much greater levels of dis-aggregation are necessary to project GDP. Finally, and most
importantly, the quality of GDP data is low for developing economies. The Penn Tables
ranks the quality of its estimates from A to D. Most developing economies receive a C or D.
We suspect that these data are especially poor for the 1950’s and 1960’s.6
5

An important difference between the Penn Tables and the national accounts is that Penn calculates growth
rates in world prices while the national accounts measures growth rates in domestic prices. As a result, the
growth rates of the Penn GDP series are not the same as GDP growth rates from the domestic national
accounts see Nuxoll (1994).

6

The Penn Tables uses official exchange rates to convert price levels into dollars. This is a further source
of measurement error. From the 1950’s through the 1980’s, exchange controls and multiple exchange rates

5

What are the consequences of measurement error for tests of Balassa Samuelson? As
we show, measurement error leads to biased and inconsistent least squares estimates of β. In
particular, when we estimate (1) with cross-sectional data, the resulting least
squares estimates of β tend to increase over time.
To illustrate these effects we focus on a simple version of (1) that ignores variables
other than real income. Suppose that the following relationship holds between the price level
and real income per capita measured relative to the US:

(2)

pi* = α + β yi* + ε i

where p* is the “true” price level without measurement error and yi* = Yi − pi* . Suppose that
the measured price level contains error such that (3) holds where νi is measurement error
with mean zero and normally distributed.

(3)

pi = pi* + υi

Using the definition of real income, we can write:

(4)

yi = Yi − pi = Yi − ( pi* + υi ) = yi* − υi

were endemic in the developing world see Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). For many developing countries,
official rates often bore little resemblance to the exchange rate applied to most transactions. Official
exchange rates will thus distort the Penn price level measures. In contrast, the Penn GDP volume measures
are in constant 1996 world prices. They are not influenced by exchange rates.

6

Throughout, we assume that nominal income is measured without error. Thus, by
construction, any error in p will produce an equal and offsetting error in y. Using (2), (3) and
(4), we obtain the following:

(5)

pi − υi = α + β ( yi + υi ) + ε i

Rearranging, we get:

(5a)

pi = α + β yi + wi

where wi = ε i + (1 + β )υi .

From (5a), the independent variable, yi, is correlated with the error term, wi.
Consequently, the standard assumptions break down and the least squares estimation of (5a)
produces biased and inconsistent estimates of β.
What is the nature of the bias? We provide the probability limit for the OLS
estimator of β with measurement error in (6) where σ υ2 and σ y2* are variances of the
measurement error, vi , and real income, y*i, respectively. (See Appendix 1 for a derivation)

(6)

^

plim β =

β ⋅ σ y2 − σ υ2
*

σ + συ
2
y*

2

β−

σ υ2
σ y2

*

=
1+

συ
σ y2

2

*

^

If β is positive, measurement error will bias the OLS estimate β downwards. As the
variance of measurement error σ υ2 increases, the estimated β can be negative. As noted
7

earlier, measurement error for the Penn Tables is likely greatest for the 1950’s and 1960’s,
suggesting that the estimated β will tend to have smaller values for these years. Since
measurement error decreases as we move closer to the benchmark year, 1996, the estimated

β will increase over time.7 Thus, measurement error can explain both aspects of the long run
price puzzle. It explains why Balassa Samuelson is weak for the early post-war decades and
it explains why it gets stronger over time.
How do we test Balassa Samuelson when there is GDP measurement error? One
option, suggested by the working paper version of Bergin et al (2006), is to estimate (1) with
benchmark data. By benchmark data, we mean GDP comparisons based on detailed price
and expenditure data. There are no projection errors for benchmark data by construction and
overall measurement error is small. As discussed in Section Five, the drawback of
benchmark data is that they are available for isolated years with no coverage of developing
economies before recent decades.8
Alternatively, we could pursue econometric solutions to measurement error. The
problem with this approach is that it requires information on the variance of measurement
error.9

7

The bias due to official exchange rates is different. Assume that the average exchange rate applied to
international transactions is e. Assume further that this rate differs from the official market rate e. In this
case, equation (1) becomes (1*).
(1*)

p = α + βy + (e-e) + ε

It follows from (1*) that official exchange rates introduce an omitted variable bias. In practice, the
differences between e and e are greater for poorer economies. It is straightforward to show that this will
also bias estimates of β from (1) downwards.
8

There are no ICP benchmarks for developing economies before 1967.

9

In his study of convergence, De Long (1988) adjusts for GDP measurement error with a maximum
likelihood procedure by making assumptions about the relative variance of measurement error; see also
Temple (1998). This is especially difficult in our case as the errors change over time.

8

The third option tests Balassa Samuelson with nominal income per capita as in
equation (7) where Y is relative nominal income in terms of the US. Equation (7) is a
transformation of (1). It has a long history dating to the classic papers of Balassa (1964,
1973). Of late, it has attracted less attention.10 As we shall see, (7) has advantages over (1)
when GDP data suffer from measurement error.

(7)

pit = Zit ⋅ at + btYit + eit

where
⎛ 1
at = α t ⋅ ⎜
⎝ 1+ β

⎞
ε
β
, eit = it
⎟, b =
1+ β
1+ β
⎠

By definition, Y = p+y. Since measurement errors in p and y have the same
magnitude while differing in sign, the errors cancel for nominal income.11 If equation (7)
satisfies the other classical assumptions, the OLS estimator for b is consistent and yields
unbiased estimates of the Balassa Samuelson effect.
While (7) eases measurement error it does so at the cost of introducing a second bias
working in the opposite direction. The bias arises as p, the dependent variable, is also used to
construct nominal income on the right-hand-side of (7). The endogeneity of nominal income
leads to a classic simultaneous equations bias. In our case, this will bias the b coefficient
upwards leading to an overstatement of the Balassa Samuelson effect. Sections four and five
10

An exception is Prados de la Escosura (2000) who estimates (7) with ICP benchmark data. His work
covers mainly developed economies.

11

Official exchange rates create fewer problems for (7) because the relative price level and nominal income
are calculated using the same (official) exchange rate.

9

propose various techniques to adjust for the endogeneity of nominal income. First, however,
we take a closer look of the relationship between income and the price level in Penn data.

3.

The Evidence from Cross Sections of the Penn Tables
This section applies (1) and (7) to Penn Tables data. We focus on the cross sectional

relationship between income and the price level using a balanced panel of fifty-eight
economies with data from 1950 to 2000.12
The first panel of Figure One presents the least squares estimates of β from (1) by
year for each cross section. We also provide confidence bands at the ninety percent level.
The results are identical to Bergin et al (2006). They show no Balassa Samuelson effect for
the 1950’s. This is the first part of the long run price puzzle. After the early 1960’s, we see
the expected positive relationship between the price level and real income. As pointed out by
Bergin et al (2006) Balassa Samuelson strengthens almost monotonically. By 2000, the
elasticity of the price level with respect to real income, β, is 0.5. This compares to an
elasticity of 0.15 for 1970 and 0.05 for 1950. The rise in Balassa Samuelson is the second
part of the long run price puzzle.

12

To ensure comparability with Bergin et al (2006) we take our data from Penn Tables version 6.1. This version has
no 1950 data for Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Greece, Paraguay, Sweden and Taiwan. We assume that
the 1950 values for relative income and relative prices equal their 1951 values. This explains why we have a slightly
larger sample than Bergin et al (2006). After 1997, we have no data for Taiwan, Guyana and the Congo Democratic
Republic.
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Figure 1: Simple Regression Results from Penn Tables Data
i) Estimates of β with Relative Real Income Data
0.5

β estimates
90% confidence bands
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ii) Estimates of b with Relative Nominal Income Data
0.5

b estimates
90% confidence bands

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1
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Panel (ii) provides the least squares estimates of (7) where we regress price on
nominal income ignoring, for the moment, potential endogeneity. With nominal income, the
Balassa Samuelson effect is present for all decades. Thus, measurement error can explain the
first part of the long run price puzzle. The second aspect of the puzzle remains, however, as
Balassa Samuelson strengthens over time. The elasticity of the price level with respect to
nominal income, b, averages 0.25 for the 1950’s and the 1960’s. Since β = b/(1-b), the b
coefficient of 0.25 yields an implied elasticity of the price level with respect to real income,

11

that is β, of around one third.13 By the late 1990’s, b has increased to 0.35 giving an implied

β of 0.54 showing that Balassa Samuelson has greatly strengthened since the 1950’s.
What lies behind these results? Here it is worth pointing out a fundamental feature of
the Penn data. As it turns out, price level differences between rich and poor economies
widened after the 1980’s. One way to see this is to look at the average price level, measured
relative to the US, for the ten poorest economies. This is around sixty per cent of the US for
the 1960’s. By the 1990’s, it is down to thirty percent with most of the decline occurring
after 1985.14 Since there is no corresponding decline in relative income, simple regressions
of prices on either real or nominal income as in Figure One will attribute the fall in relative
price levels for poor economies to a strengthening of Balassa Samuelson.
To sum up, GDP measurement error can explain the first part of the long run price
puzzle. This conclusion is, however, tentative. First, our approach leaves out key variables
such as commercial policy and changes in the external terms of trade that influence price
levels. Second, the results are biased in favor of Balassa Samuelson since nominal income is
endogenous. The next section addresses both concerns with a panel model.

Formally, the recovered β from (7) is not the same as the β estimated in (1). This is true even without
measurement error as the recovered β from (7) minimizes the sum of squares of the ν’s while the β estimate
from (1) minimizes the sum of square of the ε’s. We ignore this distinction in what follows.

13

14

A second way to see this is to note that equations (1) and (7) are stable for developed economies over the
post-war period. Both yield an estimate of β close to 0.5 for the entire postwar period. The secular
increase in β is thus due to developing economies. Prados de la Escosura (2000) also finds that (7) is stable
over time for his sample developed economies.
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4.

Panel Results
This section provides a panel model to incorporate a time series dimension in our

tests of Balassa Samuelson. The panel estimates also provide solutions to the endogeneity of
nominal income and omitted variables. As it turns out, our previous results continue to hold.
We focus on (7) as our preferred specification. As noted earlier, the simple version of
(7) from the previous section ignores other variables most notably commercial policy and
changes in the external terms of trade that influence the price level.15 Our findings could
therefore be due to omitted variable bias. Unfortunately, there are no satisfactory data on
these variables. How do we account for omitted variables? Dynamic panel models provide
one solution. Such models, however, are inappropriate for our case since they downplay
cross-sectional variation in prices and income. Such variation is essential when testing
Balassa Samuelson.16 A further drawback of dynamic panel model estimators is that they
can exacerbate measurement error bias (see Hauk and Wacziarg (2004)).17
Our solution is to add regional dummies for Asia, Latin America and Africa.18 The
regional dummies are crude but they allow us to account for shocks that are specific to these
regions, particularly commercial policy and changes in the external terms of trade by
sacrificing some cross-country variation in income and prices. If anything, the dummies will
bias the results against finding Balassa Samuelson.
15

Edwards (1989) surveys the large literature in this area. Prados de la Escosura (2000) provides a more
recent discussion.

16

One way to see the importance of cross sectional variation in the levels of prices and income is to note
that there is no relationship in Penn data between relative income and the price level in differences.

17

Barro (1997, 2000) strikes a cautionary note about fixed effects and dynamic panel techniques generally.
His observations are borne out by the Monte Carlo study of Hauk and Wacziarg (2004).

18

Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2004) endorse the use of regional dummies in similar circumstances to
ours.
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The pooled version of (7) is (8).

pt = Xt d+vt

(8)

for t=1,…, T

where pt is a N × 1 vector of prices, Xt is a N × k matrix of explanatory variables, vt is the
error terms at time t, and d is the k × 1 vector of parameters. We pool using an OLS panel
estimator with a Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroscadasticity consistent covariance
estimator. To extend the Newey-West procedure to the panel case, we assume that:

= c|t − s| ≠ 0 for | t − s |≤ L
⎧⎪σ
, for all i’s
E (ν itν is ) = ⎨ ii,| t − s |
otherwise
⎪⎩ 0

(9)

where L is some positive integer. The formulation assumes that there is no heteroscedasticity
across countries but that the error term for each country is autocorrelated. Given these
assumptions, the asymptotic covariance estimates of the OLS estimator are:

Asy. Var(d)= ( X' X ) Π ( X' X )
−1

(10)

−1

where:
Π = ( X ' ⋅ kron( IT , Ψ 0 ) ⋅ X ) + 2 w1 ( X (2,T )' ⋅ kron( IT −1 , Ψ1 ) ⋅ X (1,T −1) )
+ 2 w2 ( X (3,T ) ' ⋅ kron( IT − 2 , Ψ 2 ) ⋅ X (1,T − 2) ) + L
+ 2 wL ( X ( L +1,T ) ' ⋅ kron( IT − L , Ψ L ) ⋅ X (1,T − L ) ) ,

14

X is the NT × k matrix of stacked explanatory variables, X(t , s ) is the stacked explanatory
variables starting time t and ending s, IT is the T-dimensional identity matrix and

Ψ s = E (vt ⋅ vt − s ) and ws = 1 − 1 ( L + 1) . Note that kron is the kronecker product operator.
We report the results of the panel estimation in Table 1. We choose L = 4. Higher
values for L do not alter the significance of the parameter estimates. We report the results
with regional dummies and without.
The first panel gives the results without dummies. The results are consistent with
earlier findings. The Balassa Samuelson effect is present for all decades and increases over
time.19 For recent years, the implied elasticity of the price level with respect to income
suggested by the panel estimates of b is around one half. This is close to the results from the
cross-sections of the Penn Tables.

19

We obtain similar results to those provided in Figure 1 for pooled versions of (1).
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Table 1
Panel Estimates with Robust Standard Errors
_____________________________________________________________
Number of
countries

b

se

1950-1960
1960-1970
1970-1980
1980-1990
1990-2000

0.220
0.200
0.289
0.314
0.363

0.030
0.022
0.026
0.008
0.012

R-square
0.29
0.40
0.49
0.71
0.87

1950-1970
1970-2000
1950-2000

0.211
0.333
0.305

0.019
0.011
0.010

0.36
0.74
0.64

58
55
55

With Regional
Dummies
1950-1960
0.388
1960-1970
0.288
1970-1980
0.392
1980-1990
0.342
1990-2000
0.319

0.038
0.037
0.041
0.028
0.022

0.46
0.48
0.61
0.75
0.89

58
58
58
58
55

1950-1970
1970-2000
1950-2000

0.028
0.019
0.016

0.45
0.76
0.68

58
55
55

0.353
0.358
0.377

58
58
58
58
55

_____________________________________________________________
Notes: The estimates use an OLS panel estimator with a Newey-West autocorrelation and
heteroscadasticity consistent covariance estimator. The second panel includes regional
dummies.

The second panel gives the results with regional dummies. The dummies do not
change the support for Balassa Samuelson for early decades. On the contrary, they
strengthen the case for Balassa Samuelson. Note also that b is relatively constant over time
with this specification.
As we have seen, the endogeneity of nominal can lead to an overstatement of b. As a
solution, Table 2 provides instrumental variable estimates. We use the fifth lag of nominal
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income as our instrument. This is the appropriate lag given our previous choice of four lags
to adjust for autocorrelation.20 Table 2 provides the results.
Table 2
Panel Estimates with Instrumental Variable Approach
_____________________________________________________________
Number of

1955-1964
1965-1974
1975-1984
1985-2000

0.189
0.219
0.277
0.346

0.028
0.024
0.026
0.012

r-square
0.33
0.47
0.53
0.85

1955-1974
1975-2000
1955-2000

0.205
0.329
0.296

0.019
0.012
0.011

0.40
0.76
0.66

b

se

countries

58
55
55

58
58
58
55

With Regional
Dummies
1955-1964
0.304
1965-1974
0.275
1975-1984
0.313
1985-2000
0.276

0.04
0.042
0.047
0.022

0.45
0.56
0.62
0.86

58
58
58
55

1955-1974
1975-2000
1955-2000

0.029
0.022
0.018

0.50
0.78
0.69

58
55
55

0.299
0.303
0.330

_____________________________________________________________
Notes: We pool using an OLS panel estimator with a Newey-West autocorrelation and
heteroscadasticity consistent covariance estimator.

The previous results continue to hold: Balassa Samuelson is present for all decades.
As we might expect, instrumenting for nominal income reduces b. For the final decades, the
b coefficients with instruments imply a β value in the 0.38-0.45 range, smaller than the
implied estimate of 0.5 without instruments.
20

The counterpart of (10) for instrumental variables replaces all front matrices X by the instrumental
~

~

X ' X by X' X ,
~
⎛ '
⎞
'
0
0
replace ( X ⋅ kron( IT , Ψ ) ⋅ X ) by ⎜ X ⋅ kron( IT , Ψ ) ⋅ X ⎟ .
⎝
⎠
variable X in all matrix products. For example, replace
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5

Some Extensions

The previous section used instrumental variables to adjust for endogeneity of nominal
income. This section develops an alternative procedure based on a Monte Carlo simulation.
We then crosscheck the results with benchmark data from the International Comparison
Project (ICP).

a.

A Monte Carlo Simulation
The expected value of b from (7) is not zero due to the endogeneity of b. We use a

Monte Carlo simulation to explore this bias. The simulation works by applying least squares
estimation to simulated nominal income data where we impose the condition that there is no
Balassa Samuelson effect. Repeating the simulation five thousand times, we determine the
distribution of the b estimates from (7) for each year. By comparing the critical values from
the simulated distribution to our estimates of b, we determine their statistical significance.
Appendix Two provides a full account of the procedure.
Figure Two provides the critical values for the b distribution at the upper five percent
level derived from the Monte Carlo simulations under the null that the Balassa Samuelson
effect is zero. For comparison, we provide the b estimates by year estimated from the cross
sections of the Penn data. For reasons explained in the appendix, we include regional
dummies in the cross-sections.
When the estimated b coefficient exceeds the critical value in Figure 2 we reject the
null hypothesis that β is zero. For most years, the results suggest a statistically significant
Balassa Samuelson effect. The only cases where we do not reject the null are for the middle
1960’s.

18

Figure 2: Estimates of b and Simulated Critical Values
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Benchmark Data
The final confirmation uses benchmark data from the International Comparison

Project. The OEEC provide benchmark GDP and price level comparisons for 1950 and
1955 covering nine developed economies. Published ICP data covers 1967, 1970, 1973,
1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1996.21 The benchmarks are largely free from measurement
error. What do they tell us about Balassa Samuelson? As it turns out, this is a more
difficult question than it might seem. The problem is OEEEC/ICP data do not cover the
1960’s and cover only a small number of developed economies for the 1950’s. The
1950’s data lack the variation in prices and income necessary to test Balassa Samuelson.
After 1970 as only the 1975, 1980 and 1996 rounds have developing economies. In

21

If exclude Germany and Yugoslavia from the study due to boundary changes, the number of countries for
each year are 1950(8), 1955(8), 1967(5), 1970(15), 1973(15), 1975(32), 1980(34), 1985(20), 1990(21),
1996(95). Our data sources are: 1950 and 1955 from Gilbert and Kravis (1958), Table 5 page 30. 1970,
1973 and 1975 from Kravis, Heston and Summers (1975, 1982). 1980, 1985 and 1990 is from Maddison
(1995). 1996 is from Heston and Aten (2002), Table 2 page 31.
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addition, the ICP data are available only in Fisher ideal form whereas the Penn estimates
are in 1996 world prices. As a result, the ICP results are not directly comparable with
those from the Penn Tables.
What do the benchmark data show? Estimating equation (1) for 1950 and 1955, we
find no statistically significant effect. This is not surprising given the limited variation in
prices and income. On the other hand, the Balassa Samuelson effect is present for other
rounds.
To summarize the data, we estimated (1) and (7) by pooling across the various
OEEC/ICP rounds. 22 Depending on the specification, equation (1) provides estimates of β in
the 0.25-0.35 range. These are lower than the Penn results reflecting differences between the
Fisher Ideal measures of the OEEC/ICP and the 1996 world prices of the Penn Tables. For
equation (7), the benchmark data provide coefficient values for b clustered in the 0.28-0.32
interval implying a β in the 0.39 to 0.50 range. The benchmark data are thus broadly
consistent with our earlier findings in the sense that Balassa Samuelson appears to be present
in the data and the β implied by the OLS estimates of b from (7) is consistently higher than
the β obtained from (1). To our surprise, when we formally tested whether the β’s differed
for year, we find little evidence that this is the case suggesting that Balassa Samuelson is
present in the data and stable over time.

22

Following the procedures of Kravis (1976) and Maddison (1995), we calculate relative GDP with revised
data on nominal GDP. This means that our estimates differ from the original ICP Fisher GDP benchmarks.
For the most part, the differences are small.
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6.

Summing Up

The Balassa Samuelson effect is fundamental to our understanding of what occurs
during economic growth. Yet, standard data sets only show evidence of a positive
relationship between real income and the price level for recent decades. We attribute this
result to GDP measurement error. After taking account of measurement error in real GDP
and the endogeneity of nominal income, we find evidence supporting Balassa Samuelson for
all post-war decades. These results hold for the Penn Tables. They also hold for the
benchmark data from the International Comparison Project. We conclude that Balassa
Samuelson is a robust feature of the post-war data.
In common with Bergin et al (2006), we find that Balassa Samuelson is strengthening
over time. As we have pointed out, this occurs because of a decline in relative price levels
for low-income economies. Why have price levels for poor economies fallen relative to
developed economies? One possibility is globalization. Since the late 1980’s, the
developing world has seen remarkable increases in openness. Wacziarg and Welsh (2003)
building on earlier work by Sachs and Warner (1995) categorize economies as open or closed
for each year from 1950 to 2000. Only twenty percent of the economies in our sample are
open for 1950. By 2000, ninety-five percent are. This explains the price falls, as we would
expect trade liberalization and openness generally to lower the price level. The timing also
fits as the rise in openness occurs mostly after the mid 1980’s. In the end, the strengthening
of Balassa Samuelson over recent decades may turn out to be yet another by product of
globalization.
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Appendix 1: The Measurement Error Bias in Tests of Balassa Samuelson

This section derives an expression for the bias in tests of Balassa Samuelson due to
GDP measurement error. For convenience, we repeat equations from the text.
Assume that the following relationship holds between the relative price level and
relative income in terms of the US:

(1a)

pi* = α + β yi* where yi* = Yi − pi*

Suppose, however, we observe pi and yi such that

pi = pi* + υi and yi = Yi − pi = Yi − ( pi* + υi ) = yi* − υi

Assuming that the error term, ε, obeys the usual restrictions we get (2a).

(2a)

pi = α + β yi + wi

where wi = ε i + (1 + β )υi .

Note that the independent variable, yi and error term, wi, are correlated. The OLS estimator
^
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Appendix 2: Obtaining the Simulated Distribution for the b estimates

This appendix describes the Monte Carlo simulations from Section Five To explain
our procedures, we repeat equation (1) below as equation (1b) where εit in (1b) is assumed to
be normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation, σ εt .

(1b)

pit = Zit ⋅ α t + β t yit + ε it

We focus is on b estimated from from equation (7) in the text, given here as (7b).

(7b)

pit = Zit ⋅ at + btYit + eit

Our objective is to obtain the distribution of the b coefficient when the Balassa
Samuelson effect is zero, that is under the null that β = 0 in equation (1b). Recall that b
will not equal zero in this case given that nominal income is endogenous.
The simulation data comprises the following: the observed exogenous variables,
Z; simulated price data generated by equation (1b) under the null hypothesis that Balassa
Samuelson is zero; simulated nominal income constructed to include the same
(simulated) noise term as the price level.
The parameters for the simulation come from unconstrained estimates of the
system using actual data. In estimating β, we assume that the 1996 ICP benchmark data
is error free. We choose 1996 for two reasons. First, it is the benchmark year of the Penn
Tables. Second, we have benchmark data for all our economies from Heston and Aten
(2002). To implement the simulation we also have to assume that β is constant over
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time.23 We calculate b from β using the fact that b = β/(1+β) as in (7b). To be consistent
with this assumption, we use regional dummies in our estimation of (7b) as this produces
estimates of b that are also constant. Given b, we regress pit − b ⋅ Yit on Zit to estimate at.
^

In the next step, we obtain the “predicted” price at time t, as p it = Zit ⋅ at + bYit . We then
^

use the sample standard deviation of pit − p it at time t, that is the actual minus the
predicted price level, as our measure of σ εt .
Next, we obtain the simulated price levels. First, we generate εi for time t with
mean zero and standard deviation σ εt using a random number generator. We simulate
price from pi = Zit ⋅ α t + ε i , where α t = at (1 + β ) . This imposes a zero Balassa Samuelson
effect. To obtain the distribution of b, the simulated nominal income must contain the
same noise terms as the simulated price data. To ensure this is the case, we generate
^

“basis” real income yitb = Yit − pit . From this, simulated nominal income is Yi = yitb + pi ,
where p is the simulated price level.
The final step uses the simulated pi, Yi and Zit to estimate (7a) by least squares.
We repeat this procedure 5000 times to get the distribution of b estimates.

23

Alternatively, we could use the price predicted by estimating (7b) directly as “predicted” prices and the
Penn real income measure as “basis” real income even if the actual real income is subject to large
measurement errors. Because we use the β estimate of 1996 to generate the predicted prices for all t, our
measure of the standard deviation σ ε t is larger, resulting in a wider confidence band for b than the

alternative. Thus, our procedure is more likely to accept the null of no Balassa-Samuelson effect.
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